We analyze the role of social structure in maintaining cooperation within a population of adaptive agents for whom cooperative behavior may be costly in the short run. We use the example of a collection of agents playing pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma. We call sustained cooperative behavior in such circumstances a 'cooperative regime'. We show that social structure, by channeling which agents interact with which others, can sustain cooperative regimes against forces that frequently dissolve them. We show in detail the process through which structured interaction in a population creates a "shadow of the adaptive future" allowing even a small set of cooperative strategies to grow into a cooperative regime, a coherent, self-sustaining entity that is something more than the sum of the pairwise interactions among its members.
Introduction
In situations with Prisoner's Dilemma logic, where collectively beneficial actions are costly to individuals in the short run, theories based on assumptions of rational agents predict that cooperation should be difficult to sustain. At the same time, sustained voluntary cooperation is a recurring feature of real social systems. Cooperative action may have results that we admire, as when team members make sacrifices on behalf of their colleagues, or it may have results that we dislike, as when firms collude to fix prices in spite of competitive forces. But in either case, the existence of voluntary cooperation is not in doubt.
Cooperation is not universal, of course, and a major strength of rational agent theories is the explanation they provide for the difficulty of sustaining cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. Nonetheless, there is a disjuncture between the outcomes expected under theories of rational individual action and the cooperative actions that are frequently observed in the world, and the disjuncture poses a serious challenge. How should we account for the cases where a durable 'cooperative regime' does form?
A principal response to this challenge has been to invoke the "folk theorem," e.g., (Fudenberg and Maskin 1990) , of which Axelrod's "shadow of the future" (Axelrod 1984) can be seen as a special case. If one rational agent expects its present actions to affect the future behavior of the other, then a less valued outcome in the short run might be justified in view of a long run with increased expected value.
However, cooperation in the real world occurs in many situations that do not meet the conditions for an explanation based upon the shadow of the future. This approach assumes that the two interacting agents have strategies that remain constant over the interval of iterated play. But we know, for example, that trustworthy practices are maintained in securities trading pits even though strategies are changing rapidly during "play" (Baker, Adler and Adler 1984) . The shadow of the future approach also assumes that the interaction is between agents who remain the same. But we know that norms are sustained over long periods of time in larger systems such as universities and legislatures, even though individual members may turn over rapidly and many shirk the costs of enforcing norms against violators (Axelrod 1986 ).
For worlds where interaction sequences may be short, where agents may be rapidly changing their strategies, or where agents may be turning over, the conventional shadow of the future approach does not suffice. How then do we account for the emergence in such settings of 'cooperative regimes,' durable high levels of cooperative action within large populations of agents?
Our answer focuses on social structure, which determines the patterned character of interaction among agents or:
"who tends to interact with whom?" Though our approach is via formalized models, the work is much in the spirit of Giddens' structuration theory (Giddens 1984) .
He defines social structure as "the patterning of interaction, as implying relations between actors or groups, and the continuity of interaction in time" (Giddens 1979) . Our simulations show how the micro-level actions taken by local, changing, and self-interested actors can build and maintain a cooperative regime, which in turn stabilizes their actions and provides the conditions --Giddens might say "resources" --that their strategies require (Kluever and Schmidt 1999).
The continuity of interaction patterns, which we label as 'context preservation,' plays a crucial role in fostering and sustaining cooperative regimes by altering the adaptive dynamics of agent populations.
Our argument proceeds as follows. We describe our framework for controlled experimentation with simulated populations of agents playing a pairwise iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. We compare several sets of studies completed within
this simulation environment to demonstrate the contribution of context-preserving social structure to the emergence of cooperative regimes. We present a micro-level analysis of the process by which cooperation does, or does not, emerge.
It shows the central role played by social structure in creating a 'shadow of the adaptive future.' We use this label to distinguish the effects of future interactions on the survival chances of variant strategies being generated by the adaptive processes of the present. A favorable shadow of the adaptive future implies conditions that amplify the spread of cooperative strategies. The paper concludes with a discussion of the potential implications of our results for concrete issues, such as the maintenance of trust in the Internet.
Experimental Framework
In our simulations a period consists of each of 256 agents 1 selecting four others to play iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. We use the standard payoff matrix shown in Table 1 .
Pairs of agents play a game of length four, short enough to make cooperation difficult to achieve, but still possible (Riolo 1997a ). An agent's strategy is updated at the close of each period based on comparison with the other agents it encountered, according to rules which will be described below.
Each agent's strategy is represented as in (Nowak and Sigmund), by a triplet of real numbers 0 • y, p, q • 1. The first of these, y, represents the probability that the agent will cooperate on the first move of a game. The second, p, is the probability that an agent will cooperate following a cooperative move by the agent with which it is playing. The last, q, is the probability that the agent will cooperate after the other agent has defected. We initialize y as equal to p, but they may vary independently thereafter 2 . This large space of possible strategies contains Tit-for-Tat (TFT: 1,1,0), Always Cooperate (ALLC: 1,1,1), and Always Defect (ALLD: 0,0,0).
Our interest is in adaptive settings, where an agent's strategy may change over time. We have studied several processes of adaptation, but, for simplicity, report only one here. At the close of each period, an agent takes as its own strategy for the next period the strategy of that agent among those it met whose average score per move was best --provided that score was strictly greater than the agent's own.
Processes of emulation are subject to errors, of course.
An agent may inaccurately perceive the strategy of another it wants to copy, or may not judge correctly how well another's strategy has performed. We reflect these errors of emulation in our simulation by introducing two kinds of "noise." Agents reach the wrong conclusion ten percent of the time in comparing their own recent per move score to that of the best performing agent they've encountered.
This results in their occasionally copying an inferior strategy or failing to copy a superior one. Agents also make errors in the actual copying process. For each of the three variables, there is a ten percent chance that during copying the variable value will be disturbed by Guassian noise of mean 0 and standard deviation 0.4, with truncation of values falling above 1 or below 0.
In the studies reported below we systematically vary the social structure that controls the meetings among the agents. Iterative play occurs on a quick time scale within each period. Adaptation occurs on a slower time scale, over a succession of periods as the inter-agent emulation process spreads strategies that are succeeding and extinguishes those that are not. A complete description of the experimental procedures used to produce the results presented in this paper is given in the Appendix 3 .
Results

Cooperation levels in alternative social structures
We ran 30 replications of each experimental condition, each started with a different random number seed. Thus each replication generates a distinct "population history" for the given social structure. The first row of Table 2 reports a study in which each agent played with four other agents chosen randomly in each period. (Thus, on average, an agent played eight others, exactly four as the chooser of partners, and, on average, four as the chosen other.) A population played for 2500 periods, starting from strategies which were initialized randomly.
We have devised many measures on these data, but report only three here:
1. the proportion of thirty populations that ever achieved a high level of cooperation at any time in their history ('Attain High C');
2. the average score attained by all the populations over the last 1000 periods of their history (after the effects of random initialization have long died away) ('Mean Payoff'); and 3. the proportion of time spent in conditions of high cooperation among those populations that ever achieved it ('Remain High').
As the first row in At a substitution probability of zero, the model is identical to the FRN case. At a probability of 1.0 it is identical to pure RWR. Every pairing is chosen at random every period. The sixth and seventh rows of Table 2 show the results for the intermediate substitution probabilities of 0.3 and 0.5. The first of these variants causes a marked departure from the FRN dynamics. The second increase in the substitution probability is sufficient to produce histories quite similar to the pure RWR case.
As we "turn the dial," random substitution of new partners into the fixed network increases, and therefore context preservation declines. Around a parameter value of 0.3 the dynamics shift. The ability to sustain cooperative regimes weakens, and then, at levels of 0.5 and above, it collapses. These results for sets of populations histories (i.e., individual runs of the model) strongly suggest that context-preservation plays an essential role in the emergence and maintenance of cooperative regimes.
Detailed investigation of processes leading to a cooperative regime
To understand this fundamental pattern we trace through qualitatively similar dynamics that are found in the detailed events within our simulated histories. We will
show that context-preserving social structure reshapes this basic pattern into a cooperative regime by maintaining interaction patterns among agents as their strategies adapt.
In effect, this creates a shadow of the adaptive future.
This concept, distinct from the familiar shadow of future, is defined on the time scale of adaptation rather than that of iterative play. Games here are only four moves long, too short for the effective operation of the traditional shadow notion. What drives the shadow of the adaptive future is the benefit derived from keeping together agents whose strategies developed through emulating each other.
Since there is no best strategy in Prisoner's Dilemma (independent of the others' strategies), it is crucial for cooperation that a strategy to encounter others with which it is compatible. A context-preserving social structure means that strategies resulting from today's interactions will be near each other tomorrow. This fosters the emergence of mutually-compatible strategies.
We use the label 'friendly' for strategies with high values of p, those tending strongly to respond to cooperation with cooperation. The label 'provocable' characterizes strategies with low q, that is those with a strong tendency to follow a defection with a defection.
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In a context-preserving social structure, if an agent does well by employing a friendly strategy, it will be copied by its neighbors, and in the succeeding periods the original strategy will be interacting with its compatible "imitators." Friendly strategies such as Tit-for-Tat that diffuse through a context-preserving social structure will find themselves interacting with other friendly strategies.
If an unfriendly (low p) strategy does well, and is emulated by neighboring agents, the resulting cluster of unfriendly strategies will be interacting in the following periods, lowering each other's scores.
Friendly strategies are vulnerable to exploitation. In a randomly mixing world, adaptation drives them out in favor of unfriendly --and provocable --alternatives. But in a context-preserving world, the friendly strategies resulting from adaptation are more likely to encounter other friendly strategies. Moreover, unfriendly strategies that remain near their own kind will do less well as result. Contextpreservation allows the adaptive future to cast its shadow. This (stochastic) transition is observed repeatedly in all our simulations that engender cooperative regimes, and is not found in those that do not.
First, we describe dynamics that occur in all our simulations: an initial phase of learned mutual defection, bursts of strategies that are friendly and provocable, and "predation" of non-provocable strategies by unfriendly ones.
In section 3.3 we then describe the dynamics that distinctively characterize the transition to sustained cooperation.
The initial phase
Since we always begin a simulation with a random population of strategies located in randomly chosen positions, the first periods are very similar in all cases. Figure 2 . In the following sections we will describe the differences in these plots, which reflect the effects of the different degree of context preservation across the cases shown in Figure 2 .
Bursts of friendly strategies
We begin at the top of Figure We might describe the upward course of a burst this way:
when nearly all strategies are unfriendly and provocable (in essence, "always defect"), noisy emulation processes will produce in every period a few new strategies that are either friendly and/or nonprovocable. Either variant strategy will be expected to do badly in a predominantly defecting world, and hence will be unlikely to be retained or emulated in subsequent periods. However, chance also guarantees that there will occasionally be random meetings of two variant friendly strategies.
(Also, there will be meetings of nonprovocable variants, but unless they are also friendly, they fare poorly and immediately vanish.) A random pairing of two friendly strategies does well enough to be emulated.
Playing each other, the agents with high-p strategies may average as much as three points per move. They may average as little as 0.75 per move with always-defecting others, and there will typically be seven of those. But the average performance will work out to 8.25 / 8 which will be superior to the average of 8 / 8 that always-defects obtain with each other.
In this situation, where two friendly variant strategies have met by chance, they probably will be retained by their agents into the next time period. Moreover, the friendly strategy will be emulated by the fourteen other agents whom those two encountered (or, more precisely, by ninety percent of them, on average, since performance comparisons involve noise). Thus, the succeeding period will contain the usual sprinkling of new friendly strategies created by chance emulation errors, and about 12-13 systematically transmitted strategies with high p.
At this substantially increased density, subsequent pairings of friendly strategies are considerably more likely. At the increased density expected in the period following a single chance friendly pairing, there is a nontrivial chance of two such pairings. The logic of increased density holds across several higher levels of friendly pair occurrence, so that any period with a small number of these events has a modest probability of being succeeded by a period with a higher count. The most common outcome for any given burst of dense friendliness is still for the nascent cooperative regime to be extinguished by the predation process described in the next section. But the probabilities are such that nine of our thirty histories reached an average score over 2.3, although their time in such cooperative circumstances was extremely brief.
Predation of the friendly and non-provocable
The failure to sustain cooperation in these cases of repeated randomization can be understood from the p-q plot at the top right of Figure 2 , for the RWR case. What is evident in the diagram is that with bursts of friendly strategies average p can rise quickly to substantial levels.
This shows as the rightward arrows along the bottom edge.
But in these histories, where context is not preserved, the increase of friendly strategies is only momentary. Figure 2 shows their decline in the line of leftward pointing arrows slightly higher in the p-q space.
The RWR p-q plot (the top right of Figure 2 , or Figure 3) also shows that at any increased q level, p levels will begin to fall. This is because any of the remaining strategies with low p and q will do extremely well against another with higher q. A strategy that is completely unfriendly and provocable always defects and scores 5 points per move against a maximally friendly and nonprovocable strategy, which always cooperates. If the density is sufficient for it to meet two nonprovocable others, and its six other encounters are with friendly and provocable strategies (which correspond to Tit-for-Tat), it will average 7 --using pure types for approximation --(2*5 + 6*2)/8 = 2.75 while each of the others will average no more than (0.75 +7*3)/8 < 2.72. The always-defect strategy will be emulated by all eight others, reducing the population average for p.
In our p-q plots this gives rise to the leftward arrows seen at higher levels of q in all histories, no matter what the social structure. Once there is a sufficient density of friendly, unprovocable strategies, successful predatory exploitation by unfriendly strategies is inevitable.
However, in context-preserving structures, falling levels of friendliness are subsequently restored, while in randomly mixing systems they are not. This crucial difference is the focus of the following section.
The emergence of cooperative regimes
What distinguishes the detailed sequences of events in 
Implications
Our results are consequential --both in their implications for theory and for the illumination of important contemporary issues.
A deep implication of our results is the demonstration that the sociology of a system contributes massively to its adaptive dynamics. This is a point that goes far beyond
Prisoner's Dilemma, applying just as well to evolutionary accounts of social roles and routines. Game theory, even though it has made great progress in admitting processes of learning and adaptation (Fudenberg and Levine 1998) Note that we picked four moves per game because under the general conditions we are using, the shadow of the future imposed by that game length makes the attainment of cooperation difficult but not impossible (Riolo 1997a (Riolo , 1997b . Since the strategies do not take the move number into account, four moves per game corresponds to w = 0.75 in (Axelrod 1984) .
In our simulations a period consists of each of 256 agents in the population selecting four others to play iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) games. An IPD game consists of four moves played between agent A and one other agent, X. We use the standard payoff matrix shown in Table   1 . Each agent's strategy is represented as in (Nowak and Sigmund 1989) , by a triplet of real numbers 0 • y, p, q • 1.
The first of these, y, represents the probability that the agent will cooperate on the first move of a game. For moves after the first move, the second, p, is the probability that an agent will cooperate following a cooperative move by the agent with which it is playing. The last, q, is the probability that the agent will cooperate after the other agent has defected. We initialize y as equal to p, but they may vary independently thereafter.
For period 0, the initial population is generated by evenly distributing the agents throughout the strategy space. In each subsequent period each individual plays IPD games with a small sample of others agents from the population; which others (and the exact number) each agent ends up playing in a period depends on the selection procedure (getOtherToPlay), which is determined by the social structure being studied, as described below. As a result of these games, each individual accumulates an average payoff per move for the period. After all agents have played, agents are changed by the adaptive procedure being used for the run, as described below. Then the next period commences.
In this report we systematically vary the social structure that controls which others an agent plays each period (i.e., it controls what X is returned by the GetOtherToPlay procedure). We sometimes refer to the others an agent plays as its neighbors. In this paper we report on four social structures (or mixtures of these four): This results in their occasionally copying an inferior strategy or failing to copy a superior one. Second, regardless of which of the two strategies (its own or its best neighbors) is adopted, for each of the three parameters (y,p,q) there is a ten-percent chance that Gaussian noise is added to the parameter (mean 0, s.d. 0.4, bounded by 0 and 1), i.e., sometimes resulting in a strategy that is somewhat different from the one being adopted. Although we have not done the full analysis reported here for population sizes other than 256, our simulation runs for populations up to 4096 agents display very similar aggregate statistics to those reported here and appear to us to sustain all the relationships we report for the 256 agent case.
RWR--Random
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While the y values do in fact vary from the p values in individual agents, there is a strong correlation between agents' y and p values, and the average y closely tracks the average p. Thus to simplify the analysis, we only report analysis of the p values.
3
Complete details for a wider set of experiments, including other strategy representations, other adaptive methods, and other social structures, are available in (Cohen, Riolo and Axelrod 1999 ). Here we discuss only a subset of the experimental conditions and results that are especially pertinent to the maintenance of cooperative regimes when agents are embedded in different social structures. A very careful reader will notice very minor discrepancies due to improved treatment of infrequent tie events programmed since completion of the working paper. Those changes did not produce any differences which alter the basic results reported in either paper.
4
To appreciate the difference between a network based on geography and one based on arbitrary links, consider the contrast between two pure types. In both networks, each person has exactly four "neighbors.'' In a two-dimensional lattice, the neighborhoods are correlated. For example, a person has two neighbors in common with whomever is one step north and one step east. The correlational structure of such a geographic network means the number of people at a certain distance from any given person does not grow very quickly. In fact, the number of others who are exactly d steps away form a diamond in this lattice network, and their number increases linearly: N(d) = 4d. In contrast, consider a network in which every person is connected to four others chosen at random from a large population. In this case, the network fans out in a tree structure. A person has four immediate neighbors, each of whom has three other neighbors, and so on. For a random network in an infinite population, the number of others at a given network distance expands exponentially: N(d) = 4 × 3 d-1
. For a random network in a large finite population, two people may share more than one neighbor, but this will be rare. Rapid fan out of links in a random network can help the diffusion of information. On the other hand, rapid fan out as well as the lack of neighborhood clustering raises questions about the prospects for prosocial behavior in an uncorrelated structure. Table 3 in the Appendix reports on the fanout measured in some typical graphs used in the studies reported here; in short, the fanout for random graphs of size 256 is very close to that predicted above for d up to about 4, after which the finite size effects begin to reduce the fanout at an increasing amount. And as expected, for larger graphs the fanout approximates the theoretical limit up to higher d values.
5
Statistically, the FRNE populations actually have a better average score than the 2DK populations, but the magnitude of the difference in not important for our argument, and the direction of the difference actually makes the clustered spatial embedding slightly inferior to its fixed random equivalent.
6
The friendliness property of a strategy is not identical to the property labeled 'niceness' in (Axelrod 1984) . Strategies that are nice are not the first to defect. Provocability as used here is similar to the earlier usage.
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The unfriendly and provocable always-defect receives 5 points per move from each of its meetings with nonprovocable others, and the always-defect receives 2 points per move from each of its six games with friendly and provocable others, i.e., 5 points in the first move and 1 point on each of the three subsequent moves.
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We elaborate this point in (Axelrod, Riolo and Cohen 2000) . 
